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IN THE ‘ERA OF MIGHT AND HAPPINESS’,
WILL THE TRANS-CASPIAN PIPELINE
PROJECT BE BUILT?
TIFFANY O’KEEFE
I. Introduction
Reliable and effective transboundary transportation networks for energy
resources are vital for economic development and security. Having acquired
sovereignty after the fall of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan sought to assert their independence through constructing
transportation networks with their neighbours. By actively cooperating with
international oil companies (‘IOC’) to jointly develop major upstream
projects and regional cross-border oil and gas pipelines, Azerbaijan has
been the most successful in transporting its oil and gas to regional and
international markets.1 In the 1990s, Azerbaijan strayed from Russia’s iron
grip and together with several IOCs commenced developing its AzeriChirag-Gunashli oil fields. Then in 2006, the IOCs finished construction of
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (‘BTC’) pipeline to transport Azeri oil from the
Caspian to the Mediterranean.2
* LLB La Trobe University. LL.M. University of Melbourne. The author thanks
Professor Owen Anderson, Senior Fellow, University of Melbourne, for providing
comments on a draft of this article.
1. Nurlan Mustafayev, Production Sharing Agreements in the Petroleum Industry of
Azerbaijan 8 Journal of World Energy Law and Business 362, 362 (2015).
2. The Contract of the Century – a National Strategy for Success, BP Azerbaijan
(2019), <https://www.bp.com/en_az/azerbaijan/home/who-we-are/operationsprojects/acg2/
the-contract-of-the-century---a-national-strategy-for-success.html?fbclid=IwAR1vCa1S0u
Ok_wtj92BArkCr67EbfZKwnytoG3eCW88njpf94RC-N8a3jWo>; Agreement on the Joint
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Turkmenistan has not achieved the same level of success. The TransCaspian Pipeline (‘TCP’) was first proposed in 1996 3 to transport Turkmen
natural gas along the Caspian seabed to Azerbaijan and on to European
markets. 4 However, the TCP has become the geopolitical battleground for
various issues within Central Asia over the past few decades, and unlike the
BTC, it has not been built. With the global economy in a tailspin as a result
of the COVID-19 pandemic and oil and gas prices fluctuating between
historic lows, the prospects of completing the project have been doubted. 5
Nevertheless, now is, in fact, the perfect time to turn this pipedream into a
reality.
This article explores how the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the
Caspian Sea’s (‘Convention’) newly eased approval mechanism for laying
submarine pipelines has provided much-needed legal certainty that could
foster completion of the TCP.6 It argues that while Russian opposition casts
doubt over the prospects of success, this is eroded by Europe’s strategic
interests and financial commitment to the project. 7 Turkmenistan’s ‘Era of
Might and Happiness’, typified by a desire to diversify its gas export routes,
is then considered against difficulties that emanate from its authoritarian
regime and foreign policies.8 It is contended that while the State restricts
Development and Production Sharing for the Azeri and Chirag Fields and the Deep Water
Portion of the Gunashli Field in the Azerbaijan Sector of the Caspian Sea, BP (1994),
https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/country-sites/en_az/azerbaijan/home/pdfs/legalagree
ments/psas/ea-az-restated-acg-psa.pdf.
3. S. Rob Sobhani, Opinion, A Boost to Global Energy Security, The Washington
Times, Jun. 24, 2019, <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jun/24/why-the-transcaspian-pipeline-must-become-one-of-/>.
4. See Figure 1.
5. Daniel D. Stein, Trans-Caspian Pipeline – Still a Pipe Dream?, Atlantic Council
(2020) <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/trans-caspian-pipeline-still-apipe-dream/>.
6. Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea (Aktau, 12 August 2018, not yet
in force), available at http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5328 (‘Convention’).
7. Matthew Bryza, Robert M. Cutler, and Giorgi Vashakmadze, US Foreign Policy
and Euro-Caspian Energy Security: The Time is Now to Build the Trans-Caspian Pipeline,
Atlantic Council (2020) <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/us-foreignpolicy-and-euro-caspian-energy-security-the-time-is-now-to-build-the-trans-caspianpipeline/>.
8. ‘President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov, Ministry of Energy of
Turkmenistan (2020) <http://minenergo.gov.tm/en>. See, Turkmenistan President
Berdymukhamedov Reappears After Death Rumours, British Broadcasting Corp. (2019)
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49319380>.ˆ See also, Marika Karagianni,
Turkmenistan Looks to Gas Expansion, Petroleum Economist (2019) <https://www.
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foreign investment into its energy market, this will not be fatal to the TCP.
Ultimately the questions that arise from this article are: will the Convention
and the EU’s quest for diverse gas imports bring about the completion of
the TCP? Or, will Russia’s opposition, together with Turkmenistan’s own
foreign investment policies, defeat it?
Figure 1 – TCP Route9

II. The Convention and its Impact on the TCP
On 12 August 2018, after more than twenty years of negotiations, the
leaders of the five littoral States to the Caspian Sea – Azerbaijan, Iran,
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan – finally signed a treaty to define its
legal status. The Convention created a new legal order in the region for
laying submarine pipelines and will likely have a major impact on the
TCP’s development. Before exploring this, the prior legal uncertainty
concerning the status of the waters is outlined to highlight how it prevented
many of the littoral States from exporting petroleum products along the
Caspian seabed and on to other markets.

petroleum-economist.com/articles/politics-economics/middle-east/2019/turkmenistan-looksto-gas-expansion>.
9. Mitsui & Co., European Union Keen on Trans-Caspian Pipeline Development –
Improvement of Relations With Russia and Turkey a Key Hurdle (2019)
<https://www.mitsui.com/mgssi/en/report/detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2020/01/31/1911e_fuhr
mann_e.pdf>.
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A. Background to the Convention and the Caspian’s New Legal Status
Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea was governed
by Russia from the north and Iran from the south through several bilateral
treaties that were concluded in the first part of the twentieth century. 10 They
established that the Caspian Sea was jointly shared and closed to third
parties, however, were silent on the question of petroleum distribution and
exportation. Throughout this period, shared use heavily favoured the
powerful and formidable Soviet Union, who enjoyed regional hegemony.
Then, when the Soviet Red Flag was lowered down the Kremlin flagpole on
25 December 1991, three newly sovereign littoral States were born:
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. 11 Each wanted a share in the
Caspian’s petroleum deposits and the right to export them via submarine
pipelines along the seabed via their own transportation networks. However,
the States could not agree to a legal status that would enable a division of
the Caspian waters.
The international legal status of a body of water is important because it
helps determine which portions fall within or outside the scope of a littoral
State’s sovereign rights and obligations. This includes the right to exploit
certain portions of the seabed, as well as the right to lay submarine
pipelines for distributing petroleum products. 12 Over the course of
negotiating the legal status of the Caspian Sea, States such as Turkmenistan
favoured developing a legal regime for the Caspian waters under the
auspices of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(‘UNCLOS’).13 If UNCLOS applied, the Caspian basin would have been
legally classified as a ‘sea’.14 The provisions of UNCLOS would have
10. Treaty of Friendship, Russia–Persia, signed 26 February 1921, 9 LNTS 383 (entered
into force 7 June 1921) (‘Treaty of Friendship’); Treaty of Commerce and Navigation,
Russia-Persia, 144 British and Foreign State Papers 419 (1940–42) (signed and entered into
force 25 March 1940) (‘Treaty of Commerce and Navigation’).
11. David Reynolds, One World Divisible: A Global History Since 1945, 575 (Penguin,
2000).
12. Elena Karataeva, The Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea: The Final
Answer or an Interim Solution to the Caspian Question? 35 The International Journal of
Marine and Coastal Law 232, 255 (2020).
13. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10
December 1982, 1835 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994) (‘UNCLOS’)
available at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=
XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en; See, Jiao Yiqiang, ‘The Signing of the
Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea and its Implications’ (2019) 75 China
International Studies 178, 178-179.
14. See supra note 13.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss4/6

2021]

Will the Trans-Caspian Pipeline Project Be Built?

665

guided delimitation of maritime zones 15 and adjacent boundaries, resource
development, and the right to build infrastructure. Other States such as Iran
considered the Caspian Sea to be a ‘shared lake’, subject to customary
international law and unanimous consent. 16 There is no uniform State
practice for lake utilisation and the methods of boundary delimitation. 17
Although, Iran had suggested an equal division of the Caspian Sea between
the five littoral States, with each having a 20 per cent share under its
control.18 Given the littoral States could not agree to one of these legal
regimes, the Caspian littoral States obstructed development of the necessary
underwater infrastructure to export oil and gas to foreign markets.19
Notwithstanding the divergent legal approaches toward division of the
Caspian Sea, which at times culminated in military stand-offs bubbling to
the surface, the littoral States signed the Convention at the Fifth Caspian
Summit in Aktau, Kazakhstan in 2018.20 Russian leader Vladimir Putin
hailed the event as “truly epoch making” and diplomats labelled the
document as a regional constitution.21 Today, Iran's Majles is the only
parliament that has not yet ratified the Convention. 22 Through the
Convention, the littoral States agreed to a sui generis regime by defining
the Caspian Sea as a ‘body of water’. 23 As such, neither UNCLOS nor
15. Maritime zones under UNCLOS: Territorial Sea 12 nautical miles, Contiguous Zone
12 nautical miles, Exclusive Economic Zone 200 nautical miles, Continental Shelf, High
Seas.
16. Yiqiang, supra note 13, at 181; as will be explored later in this article, so too did
Turkmenistan at varying intervals.
17. Mariangela Gramola, State Succession and the Delimitation of the Caspian Sea in
Benedetto Conforti et al (eds), Italian Yearbook of International Law vol 14, 237-272, 239
(Brill, 2004); See, Affairs du lac Lanoux (Spain v. France) (Awards) (1957) 12 RIAA 281,
281.
18. Iran has the shortest Caspian Sea coastline, and therefore favoured this mechanism
of division because it would enable Iran to have a greater share of the sea space.
19. Pierre Thévenin, The Caspian Convention: New Status but Old Divisions? 44
Review of Central and East European Law 437, 443 (2019); See, Andrey G. Kostianoy et al,
‘Geographic Characteristics of the Black-Caspian Seas Region’ in Sergey S. Zhiltsov, Igor
S. Zonn and Andrey G. Kostianoy (eds), Oil and Gas Pipelines in the Black-Caspian Seas
Region, 8 (Springer, 2016).
20. Karataeva, supra note 12, at 255.
21. Phoebe Greenwood, Landmark Caspian Sea Deal Signed by Five Coastal Nations,
The Guardian (online, 12 August 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2018/aug/12/landmark-caspian-sea-deal-signed-among-five-coastal-nations>.
22. Joseph Murray, Russia Ratifies Caspian Convention, Natural Gas World (2019)
<https://www.naturalgasworld.com/russia-ratifies-caspian-convention-73460>.
23. Convention, supra note 6, at art 1.
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customary international law concerning lakes apply to the governance of
the waters. Although similar to UNCLOS, the Caspian Sea is now divided
into different maritime zones. Each littoral State now has exclusive control
over an area extending up to 15 nautical miles from its shores for mineral
and energy exploration, known as the territorial waters, and a further ten
miles for fishing. 24 The area beyond is shared jointly, 25 and questions on
delimitation for each maritime zone are to be settled through further
negotiation and agreement – a gap in the Convention that has been
considered a failure. 26
Figure 2 – Caspian Maritime Zones27

24. Convention, supra note 6, at arts 6, 7 and 9. See, Figure 2.
25. Convention, supra note 6, at art 3.
26. Convention, supra note 6, at arts 7(1) and 9(1); See Karataeva, supra note 12, at 261.
27. The Caspian Summit, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Infographic, 13 August
2018) <https://www.rferl.org/a/the-caspian-summit/29430597.html>.
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B. The Convention’s Regime on Submarine Pipelines: New Hope for the
TCP
Among the Convention’s greatest achievements is the less onerous
approval regime for laying submarine pipelines. This will enhance the
prospects of the TCP being built if the littoral States implement the relevant
provisions in good faith. Article 14(1) of the Convention provides that each
littoral State may construct submarine pipelines on the seabed of the
Caspian Sea. The route must be determined by agreement between the
laying State and any other State whose seabed sector the pipeline will
traverse.28 Article 14 is similar to Articles 58 and 79 of UNCLOS, which
allows States to lay submarine pipelines within a coastal State’s exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf, subject to the consent of the
respective coastal State.29 Despite the clarity offered through Article 14, the
Convention is silent on what factors may or may not lead to granting
approvals for the routing of pipelines. Further, it is not clear whether private
sector entities themselves may apply for, or benefit from, an agreement
reached under Article 14(3).30
Nevertheless, the fact that this new approval regime exists at all is
significant. In the post-Soviet era Russia rejected the application of
UNCLOS to the Caspian Sea,31 partly because it opposed the construction
of any new pipelines along the seabed beyond its territorial waters without
its approval, something that would have been permissible under UNCLOS.
Russia’s position was likely owing to its desire to maintain a degree of
control over the transfer of oil and gas to Europe, given it owns the major
transportation networks for petroleum products in the region. Russia
consistently held this position during negotiations for the Convention, and
with Iran, sought to subject the development of pipelines to approval by all
littoral States.32 Even though it is not a party to UNCLOS, Turkmenistan
opposed this by expressing its desire for UNCLOS to apply to the waters,
28. Convention, supra note 6, at art 14(1)-(3); See, Norton Rose Fulbright, The
Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea - A sea or not a sea: that is still the
question, Norton Rose Fulbright (September 2018) <https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/
en/knowledge/publications/5f222b95/the-convention-on-the-legal-status-of-the-caspian-sea--a-sea-or-not-a-sea-that-is-still-the-question?fbclid=IwAR2Y3xqxdm5vZHKRgbkUKUqN
6NU8eGdTDDunD0i5eQGUIJfeh2N5VB3aInY>.
29. UNCLOS, supra note 13, at arts 58 and 79.
30. Norton Rose Fulbright, supra note 28.
31. Thévenin, supra note 19, at 443.
32. Andrei Kazanstev, Russian Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Region
60(6) Europe-Asia Studies 1073, 1085 (2008).
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and by extension, its applicable approval mechanisms for submarine
pipelines. 33 Despite Russia’s opposition, Turkmenistan succeeded in
including Article 14 of the Convention, which as identified above, contains
a similar approval mechanism for the laying of submarine pipelines to that
which is contained within UNCLOS.
Turkmenistan’s victory over this major global power begs the question:
why did Russia agree to forgo any veto power to approve or deny the laying
of submarine pipelines in areas beyond its territorial waters? It appears that
a mutually beneficial compromise was reached, whereby Russia traded the
approval right in exchange for restricting navigation in the Caspian Sea and
monitoring security developments. Article 3(11) of the Convention restricts
navigation in, entry to and exit from the Caspian Sea to ships flying the flag
of one of the littoral States.34 Commercial ships can also access ports and
port facilities when flying the flags of the contracting States, thus entitling
them to enjoy the same treatment as national ships of the party in whose
35
territory the port is located. This is consistent with the Soviet-Iranian
bilateral treaty system of governance that applied before the Convention
36
was signed.
Where the Convention goes further than the previous legal model is in its
regulation of the navigation of warships, submarines and other underwater
37
vessels. Article 3(6) expressly prohibits the presence of armed forces not
belonging to any of the five littoral States. Russia has persistently stressed
the importance of security in the region, especially given its concern of
being encircled by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (‘NATO’) and by
38
extension, the United States (‘US’).
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council only months
39
after the Soviet Union collapsed, and each receive substantial aid from the

33. See UNCLOS, supra note 13.
34. Convention, supra note 6, at art 3(11).
35. Convention, supra note 6, at art 10(2).
36. Karataeva, supra note 12, at 244-245, Treaty of Friendship, Treaty of Commerce
and Navigation.
37. Daniel Müller and Ketavan Betaneli, The New Convention on the Legal Status of the
Caspian Sea: New Opportunities and New Challenges, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (1
November 2018) <http://knowledge.freshfields.com/en/Global/r/3848/the_new_convention_
on_the_legal_status_of_the_caspian_sea>.
38. Thévenin, supra note 19, at 460.
39. Elkhan Mekhtiev, Security Policy in Azerbaijan, NATO (2001)
<https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/mekhtiev.pdf>; Relations with Turkmenistan,
NATO (28 September 2018) <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50317.htm>;
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40

US and NATO. Along with Iran, Russia has viewed this as a both a
41
provocation and direct threat to regional security that must be quashed.
With the new express exclusion of foreign vessels, NATO or the US will
not be able to deploy its ships or troops in the Caspian Sea via Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan, which is a major security triumph for Russia.
Further, Russia’s Caspian Flotilla, which lies ready to strike, now sits
unperturbed due to the absence of any nearby foreign vessels that may
42
block its missile attacks, serving Russia’s Middle Eastern security
strategy.
Finally, to preserve their post-Soviet autonomy, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan have hastened to develop their own national navies. This
militarisation of the Caspian Sea responds to several threats, such as
avoiding Russian, and to a lesser extent, Iranian domination, and protecting
43
existing and future maritime energy corridors. Because of the foreign aid
provided by NATO and the US, Russia has sought to consolidate its
hegemonic security position through checks on the navies of Caspian
littoral States. On this basis, Russia succeeded in having incorporated into
the Convention Articles 3(3) and 3(4), which ensure a stable balance of
armaments of the littoral States, whereby they can only develop military
capabilities within the limits of ‘reasonable sufficiency with due regard to
the interests of all the [littoral States] and without prejudice to the security
44
of each other’. Even though Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan attained the
unilateral right to construct submarine pipelines in their sovereign maritime
zones, this security trade off may, in the future, prove cumbersome.

Relations with Kazakhstan, NATO (26 March 2019) <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_49598.htm>.
40. Thévenin supra note 19, at 459; Sebastian Engels, Military Professionalisation
Programs in Kazakhstan and the United States: How to Implement and What Will We Gain?
2 Connections: The Quarterly Journal 91, 91-104 (2017); Joshua Kucera, Azerbaijan Has
Advantage Over Armenia In U.S. Military Aid, Eurasianet (17 May 2016)
<https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-has-advantage-over-armenia-us-military-aid?fbclid=IwA
R2WeO7358xccHaCYLn5T-91wxZEqVWspXhd57aV3NFQ9QMp4bqmm5gf7qs>.
41. Thévenin, supra note 19, at 459.
42. Yiqiang, supra note 13, at 187; See Russian Missiles ‘Hit IS in Syria from Caspian
Sea’, BBC (7 October 2015) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34465425>.
43. Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse, The Militarization of the Caspian Sea:
“Great Games” and “Small Games” Over the Caspian Fleets, China and Eurasia Forum
Quarterly 7/2 (2009) 17, 28.
44. Convention, supra note 6, at arts 3(3), 3(4).
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C. Environmental Objection to the TCP
The new environmental provisions within the Convention suggest that
Russia has not entirely eroded its ability to obstruct the TCP. However, this
is limited by gaps within the Convention, as well as the EU’s interest in
finalising the TCP. Article 14(2) of the Convention stipulates that
submarine pipeline projects must comply with environmental standards
embodied within international agreements, such as the Framework
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the C1aspian
Sea (‘Tehran Convention’) and its relevant protocols. 45
Concern presently exists over whether Russia, alongside Iran, will shape
their long-standing opposition to the TCP through the guise of
environmental concern, by utilising this environmental protection
mechanism contained within Article 14(2) of the Convention. This is
supported by past statements the two have made. At the 2019 Caspian
Economic Forum which took place in Avaza, Turkmenistan, Behrouz
Namdari, of Iran’s National Gas Company said, “Iran is against any transCaspian pipelines.”46 He suggested that any party seeking to transport gas
from the eastern border of the Caspian Sea to the western border should
deliver it through Iran’s pipeline network. At that time, the then current
Russian Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, who was also at the Economic
Forum, said he was “absolutely convinced that all major projects in the
Caspian Sea should undergo a thorough and impartial environmental
evaluation involving specialists from all Caspian countries.” Medvedev’s
statement is consistent with Article 17 of the Tehran Convention, which
allows each littoral State to introduce and apply procedures of
environmental impact assessment for any planned activity that is likely to
cause a significant adverse effect on the marine wildlife environment of the
Caspian Sea.47 While this requirement has the potential to be used as a
delaying tactic, Article 17(3) of the Tehran Convention requires the parties
to cooperate with one another, as does Article 3(1) of the Convention.
Moreover, there are two key gaps within the Convention that render the
impact of any environmental objection uncertain. First, Article 14(2) does
not specify what is to occur when one of the littoral States does not comply
45. Convention, supra note 6, at art 14(2).
46. Bruce Pannier, ‘Russia, Iran Cite 'Ecological Concerns' In Opposing Trans-Caspian
Pipeline’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (15 August 2019) <https://www.rferl.org/
a/russia-iran-trans-caspian-pipeline-turkmenistan/30111805.html>.
47. The Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
Caspian Sea, opened for signature November 2003, (entered into force 12 August 2006) art
17.
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with the condition that their projects conform to environmental standards –
nor does any other provision within the Convention. Second, Article 21 of
the Convention provides that disagreements and disputes, regarding
interpretation of the application of the Convention, shall be settled through
consultations and negotiations between the littoral States.48 If these
consultations and negotiations fail, recourse may be obtained through
international law.49 This dispute resolution mechanism is vague, and the
Convention does not contain provisions for judicial or quasi-judicial
review. Accordingly, fully understanding the impact of any environmental
objections to the TCP will remain unclear until these provisions are tested
in a legal forum, and until then, their potential legal effect should not be
overstated.
D. Can the European Union’s Interest in the TCP Stem the Tide Against
Russia’s Opposition to the Project?
Diversification and security of energy supply is at the heart of the
50
European Union’s (‘EU’) gas policy. When Russia’s gas flow to Ukraine
51
ceased in 2006, as well as on numerous occasions thereafter, it dawned on
the EU and other European States just how susceptible they were to Russian
52
supply shortages.
For instance, Germany, Austria, and Slovakia
experienced a 33 per cent shortfall in their gas supply, leaving millions of
53
people to face a bitterly cold winter. Approximately 40 per cent of natural
gas imports to the EU come from Russia, and given Russia’s propensity to
‘turn off the taps’, the EU has resolved to diversify and expand its gas

48. Convention, supra note 6, at art 21(1).
49. Convention, supra note 6, at art 21(2).
50. See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, opened for signature 7
February 1992, [2009] OJ C 115/199 (entered into force 1 November 1993), available at
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT,
Article
194; Energy Supply and Energy Security, European Parliament (Briefing, July 2016)
<https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/briefing_energy_supply_security.pdf>.
51. Russia also ceased gas supply to Ukraine in 2009 and 2014. See Moniek de Jong et
al., A Matter of Preference: Taking Sides on the Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline Project,
Journal of Contemporary European Studies (8 December 2020), 1 <https://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14782804.2020.1858763?needAccess=true>.
52. Friedbert Pflüger, A European View: Europe, Nord Stream 2, and Diversification,
Atlantic Council (15 March 2019) <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/aeuropean-view-europe-nord-stream-2-and-diversification/>.
53. Angela E. Stent, Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest (Twelve,
2019), 76.
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54

supply routes and sources. As part of this strategy, the European
Commission deemed it necessary to build a Southern Gas Corridor (‘SGC’)
linking the EU with the gas fields of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan through
Turkey. December 2020 marked the first time in history that gas from
Azerbaijan was transported directly through pipelines on to European
55
markets, resulting in yet another success story for Azerbaijan. However,
56
the TCP presently remains the ‘missing link’ that would enable the EU to
bring the SGC to completion. On this basis, the EU’s interest in the TCP
represents a strong opportunity to advance completion of the project and
bulwark Russia’s environmental opposition.
The EU’s interest in realising the TCP is demonstrated by its political
and commercial commitments. Practical movements were first made in
2011, when the EU initiated negotiations with Turkmenistan and
57
Azerbaijan for construction of the TCP. Just two weeks after the Caspian
Convention was signed in 2018, German Chancellor, Angela Merkel,
visited Azerbaijan to discuss the SGC and expressed clear interest in
58
advancing development of the TCP. Emphasis on the TCP’s potential to
diversify EU gas supply sources was also expressed in a statement by the
59
German Federal Foreign Office two months after Merkel’s visit. Since
2013, the economic potential of the TCP has been included in every
European Commission Project of Common Interest list.60 Projects on this
list are eligible to receive public funds and are deemed a key priority for
54. Mitsui & Co., supra note 9.
55. First Commercial Gas Delivery to Europe via Southern Gas Corridor, SOCAR
(December 2020) <https://socar.az/socar/en/news-and-media/news-archives/news-archives/
id/11516>.
56. Mitsui & Co., supra note 9.
57. Dr Robert M. Cutler, How Central Asian Energy Complements the Southern Gas
Corridor, Euractive (25 January 2018) <https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/
opinion/how-central-asian-energy-complements-the-southern-gas-corridor/>; EU Starts
Negotiations on Caspian Pipeline to Bring Gas to Europe, European Commission (2011)
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_11_1023>.
58. Ilgar Gurbanov, Caspian Convention Signing and the Implications for the TransCaspian Gas Pipeline, 15/127 Eurasia Daily Monitor (2018) <https://jamestown.org/
program/caspian-convention-signing-and-the-implications-for-the-trans-caspian-gaspipeline/>; Dr Robert M. Cutler, Momentum Accelerates for the Trans-Caspian Gas
Pipeline, NATO Association of Canada (11 March 2019) <https://natoassociation.ca/
momentum-accelerates-for-the-trans-caspian-gas-pipeline/>.
59. ‘Independence through Diversification’, Federal Foreign Office (1 October 2018)
<https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/energie/facts-on-germanysenergy-supply/2142654>; Mitsui & Co., supra note 9.
60. Matthew Bryza, Robert M. Cutler, and Giorgi Vashakmadze, supra note 7.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss4/6

2021]

Will the Trans-Caspian Pipeline Project Be Built?

673

Europe’s energy system infrastructure; thus, the TCP’s inclusion signals the
EU’s commercial commitment.
The project has also been advanced on the engineering, economical, and
environmental front. In 2017, through the Connecting Europe Facility of the
European Commission, the EU agreed to a grant of up to €1,871,725 for the
pre-Front-End Engineering Design (‘pre-FEED’) of the project, to be
carried out between 2018 and 2020.61 The purpose of a pre-FEED survey is
to confirm the technical and economic feasibility of a project. As of March
62
2021, the status of the pre-FEED surveys is ‘ongoing’ and depending on
the results, a process of consultation and design will likely follow. The
World Bank and the European Commission also executed a comprehensive
environmental scoping for the TCP in 2015, wherein it was concluded that
there were no major environmental concerns. In the event that issues may
arise, industry best practices would likely offer a solution, thus
circumventing Russia’s ability to rely on the environmental provisions of
63
the Caspian Convention as a means to obstruct development of the TCP.
Funding aside, legitimate concern has been expressed about the capacity
64
of the SGC to receive gas from Turkmenistan. The SGC begins in
Azerbaijan and links seven States before ending in Italy. It consists of three
interconnected gas pipelines, being the South Caucasus Pipeline, the TransAnatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (‘TANAP’), and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline
65
(‘TAP’). At ‘plateau’, the SGC is expected to deliver up to sixteen billion
61. ‘Trans-Caspian
Pipeline’,
W-Stream
(2020)
<http://w-streamtranscaspian.com/milestones/>; for more information on pre-FEED funding, see European
Commission, ‘Gas Pipeline to the EU from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, via Georgia and
Turkey, [Currently Known as the Combination of “Trans-Caspian Pipeline” (TCP), “SouthCaucasus Pipeline Future Expansion” (SCPFX)’, Europa (February 2021)
<https://ec.europa.eu/energy/maps/pci_fiches/PciFiche_7.1.1.pdf>.
62. Innovation and Networks Executive Agency, Pre-FEED, Reconnaissance Surveys
and Strategic and Economic Evaluations of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, Europa (March
2021) <https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility/cef-energy/7.1.1-0007-elaz-sm-17>.
63. Robert Cutler, ‘Third time lucky for Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline?’, Petroleum
Economist
(6
June
2019)
<https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/
politics-economics/europe-eurasia/2019/third-time-lucky-for-trans-caspian-gas-pipeline>.
64. Stanislav Pritchin, Energy Control Room for the Whole of Eurasia, Russia in Global
Affairs (19 March 2015) <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/energy-control-room-for-thewhole-of-eurasia/>; the author thanks Stanislav Pritchin, Senior Research Fellow at the
Institute of World Economic and International Relations, for providing access to his
publications for this article.
65. What is the Southern Gas Corridor?, Southern Gas Corridor (2021)
<https://www.sgc.az/en>; See Figure 1, which provides a map of the respective pipelines.
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cubic metres per annum of natural gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz gas
field to consumers in Southeast Europe. 66 Now if the TCP were built with a
capacity to move 30 billion cubic metres of gas, Turkmenistan would need
to install compressors at the East-West pipeline that connects its large fields
67
with the Caspian Sea. Then, the capacity of both TANAP and TAP would
68
need to be expanded to accommodate increased gas flow. While this
would be a costly endeavour, the CEO of the TANAP operating company,
Saltuk Duzyol, said in January 2021 that “any expansion of the pipeline
would happen only if gas were available at one end the pipeline and a
69
market for the gas existed at the other”. Given the EU’s listing of the TCP
as a priority project, and its continued resolve to diversify its gas supply
routes and sources, the market does appear to exist. Further, since
commercial gas deliveries to Europe from Azerbaijan have commenced via
TAP, satisfying the first market test for the pipeline, the EU’s appetite for
expansion to accommodate the TCP remains strong. The president of the
State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic, Rovnag Abdullayev, has also
said that the second market test enabling future expansion of TAP will be
70
launched mid-2021.
Germany’s ongoing commitment to Nord Stream 2 (‘NS2’) may also
71
encourage Russia to abandon its opposition to the TCP. As explored
72
above, Russia’s decision to cut off the supply of gas to Ukraine, which
flows own to European markets, sparked an urgent move by the EU to
diversify its gas supply routes and sources. Simultaneously, Russia now
wants to eliminate Ukraine as a transit State through construction of NS2,
which will deliver gas across the Baltic Sea directly to Germany. However,

66. Stein, supra note 5; BP Welcomes Completion of Southern Gas Corridor MegaProject,
BP
(2021)
<https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/
reimagining-energy/southern-gas-corridor-mega-project-completes.html>.
67. Stein, supra note 5.
68. Pritchin, supra note 64.
69. David O’Byrne, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan Agreement Advances Caspian Gas
Cooperation, Natural Gas World (31 March 2021) <https://www.naturalgas
world.com/azerbaijan-and-turkmenistan-agreement-advances-caspian-gas-cooperation84923>.
70. First Commercial Gas Delivery to Europe via Southern Gas Corridor, supra note
47.
71. Germany Backs Nord Stream 2 ‘for the time being’: Merkel, Euractive (2021)
<https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/germany-backs-nord-stream-2-forthe-time-being-merkel/>.
72. See Moniek de Jong et al, supra note 51.
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73

the $11 billion pipeline that is 90 per cent complete has been an
enormously polarising project within the EU, owing to fears that the EU has
74
become too dependent on Russian gas. The US has also imposed
sanctions on NS2 affiliated companies in attempts to halt the project,
calling it a “bad deal for Europe” that “undermines basic EU principles in
75
terms of energy security and energy independence”. Nevertheless, Russia
and Germany, along with other EU member States, remain committed to
76
the project. Given the TCP is of strategic interest to the US, a compromise
may be possible, whereby the US and EU could agree to development of
NS2 in exchange for Russia backing down from its opposition to the TCP.
Considering the political and commercial trends that have been
progressed by the EU, it is unlikely that Russia’s environmental opposition
to the TCP will succeed. The wheels are in motion for accelerating
construction, and it seems unlikely the EU would abandon the project after
making significant political and financial contributions to the pre-FEED
phase of the TCP, and the SGC.
III. Authoritarianism and Gas Diversification – Can the Two
Co-Exist to Bring About the TCP?
The authoritarian political system in Turkmenistan and its respective gas
policies may be a barrier to completion of the TCP. Turkmenistan has
solidified a firm reputation as one of the twenty-first century’s most
capriciously corrupt and repressive political regimes. 77 Following the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the first post-independence President,
Saparmurat Niyazov, cultivated an atomised and isolationist Turkmen
society, whilst consolidating a centralist political regime based on fear,

73. Germany Backs Nord Stream 2 ‘for the time being’: Merkel, supra note 70.
74. Jong et al., supra note 51; Stent, supra note 53, at 98.
75. Nord Stream 2 is a Bad Idea and a Bad Deal for Europe, US’ Antony Blinken tells
Euronews,
Euronews
(25
March
2021)
<https://www.euronews.com/
2021/03/25/nord-stream-2-is-a-bad-idea-and-a-bad-deal-for-europe-us-antony-blinken-tellseuronews>.
76. Matthew Bryza, Robert M. Cutler, and Giorgi Vashakmadze, supra note 7.
77. ‘Our Work In: Turkmenistan’, Transparency International (2020) <https://www.
transparency.org/en/countries/turkmenistan>; see Amnesty International, ‘Turkmenistan: An
“Era of Happiness” or More Repression?’ (Report, 2013) <https://www.amnesty.
org/en/documents/EUR61/005/2013/en/>.
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coercion, and secrecy. 78 As the successor since 2007, President Gurbanguly
Berdimuhamedow (‘PGB’), has followed in Niyazov’s footsteps and has
instituted a fervent cult of personality, cemented by a gilded six-metre-high
statue of the leader on horseback perched on a white cliff.79 It is this style of
government that underwrites decisions relating to the State’s energy policy.
Despite exact figures being hidden behind a wall of secrecy,
Turkmenistan holds the fourth largest natural gas reserves in the world,
having an estimated holding of 71 billion tons. 80 With natural gas as its
largest export, this means that the political and economic fate of
Turkmenistan is deeply connected to its hydrocarbon deposits and the
ability to export them to markets across the globe. When re-elected in 2012,
PGB labelled his ongoing presidency as an ‘Era of Might and Happiness’,
to be typified by an uninterrupted and reliable supply of energy to a diverse
range of foreign consumers.81 Indeed, PGB regularly announces his desire
to attract foreign investment toward the Turkmen oil and gas sector. 82
Foreign investment is undeniably a necessary ingredient for developing the
TCP, for an IOC could take on the financial risks Turkmenistan could not
bear alone on such a major project.83 However, the Turkmen government
prohibits foreign investment in onshore gas production and refuses to grant
foreign buyers equity stakes in its upstream fields.
Upstream natural gas operations involving foreign investors are
governed in Turkmenistan by Production Sharing Contracts (‘PSC’).
Turkmengaz, the State-run natural gas company, presently owns 100 per
78. Gregory Gleason, ‘Natural Gas and Authoritarianism in Turkmenistan’ in Indra
Overland, Heidi Kjaernet and Andrea Kendall-Taylor (eds), Caspian Energy Politics:
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (Taylor & Francis Group, 2010), 78.
79. ‘Turkmen Leader Cements Personality Cult with Gilded Monument’, Reuters
(online, 25 May 2015) <https://www.reuters.com/Article/us-turkmenistan-monumentidUSKBN0OA0F220150525>.
80. Oil & Gas Turkmenistan, ‘Market Overview’, OGT 2020 (2020) <https://ogtturkmenistan.com/marketoverview#:~:text=The%20country's%20hydrocarbon
%20resources%20are,after%20Russia%2C%20Iran%20and%20Qatar>.
81. ‘President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov’, Ministry of Energy of
Turkmenistan (2020) <http://minenergo.gov.tm/en>; see ‘Turkmenistan President
Berdymukhamedov Reappears After Death Rumours’, British Broadcasting Company (12
August 2019) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49319380>; see also Marika, supra
note 8.
82. Marika, supra note 8.
83. Randy Fabi, ‘Turkmenistan Won't Allow Foreign Firms into Onshore Gas
Production Sharing Deals’, Reuters (4 March 2011) <https://www.reuters.com/
Article/turkmenistan-oil/turkmenistan-wont-allow-foreign-firms-into-onshore-gasproduction-sharing-deals-idUSL3E7E405Y20110304>.
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cent of all onshore gas projects and the State normally takes a carried 20-50
84
percent stake. Turkmenistan’s energy policy dictates that IOCs contribute
to PSCs on a service-basis only, and this must be done in partnership with
Turkmengaz.85 When an IOC agrees to participate solely on a service-basis,
it agrees to perform certain specified activities for the host government in
return for a fixed payment.86 In some instances, payment to the IOC is in
the form of a priority to purchase the resulting oil at a discounted rate, as
opposed to having a share in the profit, which would occur with a typical
PSC. Under this model, if the project is only financed by the IOC on a
service-basis, absent capital investment from Turkmenistan or Turkemngaz,
the IOC becomes the sole bearer of financial risk in the event that the
project is not profitable. Considering this, many observers believe the
Turkmen model for natural gas production poses unfavourable finance and
market conditions that deter IOCs, meaning the TCP cannot be realised. 87
A. Prior and Current Contractual and Financial Models for Constructing
the TCP
It was recently observed that Turkmenistan does not need to enter into
PSCs to develop the TCP.88 Rather, investment may be sufficiently
provided by the EU through an ‘independent carrier’ model. This requires
initial capital to execute studies and obtain permits, which has already
commenced, as mentioned above. 89 To understand how this conclusion was
reached, the three key attempts at developing the TCP need to be explored.
The first attempt at development began in the late 1990s, when
Turkmenistan, along with Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia concluded
agreements for the project at an Organisation for Economic Co-Operation
and Development meeting in Istanbul. 90 It was hopeful that the TCP would
84. Stein, supra note 5; see ‘Turkmenistan Upstream Fiscal Summary’, Wood
Mackenzie (4 July 2018) <https://www.woodmac.com/reports/upstream-oil-and-gasturkmenistan-upstream-fiscal-summary-16105900/>.
85. Id.
86. Abbas Ghandi and C. Y. Cynthia Lin, ‘Oil and Gas Service Contracts Around the
World: A Review’ (2014) 3 Energy Strategy Reviews 63, 64.
87. Olzhas Auyezov, ‘Turkmenistan Should Ease Gas Investment Rules, U.S. Official
Says’, Reuters (online, 4 December 2015); Stein, supra note 5; see also ‘Turkmenistan’,
International Energy Agency for EU4Energy (2020) <https://www.eu4energy.iea.org/
countries/turkmenistan>.
88. Cutler, supra note 63.
89. Id.
90. ‘Trans-Eurasian Transportation Networks, Transportation Politics and Economics
in Eurasia’ (2016) 6(1) Caucasus International 31.
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be the eastward phase of the South Caucasus gas corridor. President
Niyazov stalled talks with Turkey because he insisted on leading the
negotiations and production without the necessary experience, which led to
the agreements never being realised.91 Azerbaijan’s natural gas discoveries
at the time and the disputed legal status of the Caspian Sea, outlined above,
only further added to the complexity of getting construction of the TCP
started.
The second attempt occurred in conjunction with the White Stream
pipeline project, which was later integrated with the EU’s SGC program,
announced in 2009. The EU and the World Bank commissioned a study for
a Caspian Development Corporation, to become the sole purchaser of
Turkmenistan’s gas to aid in facilitating planning for the project, however,
this study was unable to respond to Turkmenistan’s need for economies of
scale at export quantities. 92 This gave rise to the ‘two-entry points’ idea for
Turkmen gas to enter European markets, which now forms part of the third,
and currently ongoing, attempt. The first entry point is through the SGC via
Azerbaijan and Turkey, with the second to travel through existing
infrastructures under the Black Sea from Georgia to Romania.93
While the restriction on IOC onshore investment remains during this
third major attempt, constructing the TCP will not require Turkmenistan to
enter into a PSC with foreign entities. Turkmenistan has already developed
its abundant gas deposits in the east, and the East-West Pipeline (‘EWP’)
for transmitting the gas to Turkmenistan’s border has already been
constructed. The EWP is now capped, awaiting connection across the sea
94
by way of the TCP. Additionally, the TCP itself will be built and operated
by a pipeline company that is not owned by gas producers, following a
standard industry business and financing model. This means that an
‘independent carrier’ will execute the technical studies leading to salespurchase agreements between European buyers and Turkmenistan. 95 The
‘independent carrier’ model has provided a viable way to overcome any
requirement for a PSC that secures onshore development, therefore making
it likely that the TCP will be built.

91. Cutler, supra note 63; see ‘Trans-Eurasian Transportation Networks,
Transportation Politics and Economics in Eurasia’ (2016) 6(1) Caucasus International 1, 20.
92. Cutler, supra note 63.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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B. Cooperation Between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan
While foreign investment is necessary for constructing the TCP, and
96
PGB has endeavoured to attract this, so too is cooperation between
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. For Turkmenistan’s gas to reach European
markets via the TCP, it is necessary that the pipeline integrate with
Azerbaijan’s pipeline infrastructure. However, their relationship has been
marred with conflict since the collapse of the Soviet Union, subsequently
delaying construction. Central to their dispute was how to divide their
maritime borders, and in turn, determine ownership of three petroleum rich
sections: Azeri/Khazar-Omar, Chirag/Osman, and Kyapaz/Serdar in
97
Azerbaijani and Turkmen, respectively. British Petroleum (‘BP’) has
already developed the first two fields after signing contracts with
98
Azerbaijan, but the third field has never been developed as ownership
99
remained under dispute.

96. ‘President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov’, Ministry of Energy of
Turkmenistan, supra note 81.
97. Shamkhal Abilov, Ceyhun Mahmudlu, and Natig Abdullayev, Contested Waters:
Implications of the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea and the Future
of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, Insight Turkey 22/4 (2020) 229, 230.
98. Caspian Calling: A View of Azerbaijan’s Oil Fields, BP (14 September 2017)
<https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/reimagining-energy/in-photosazeri-chirag-deepwater-gunashli-oil-fields-azerbaijan.html>.
99. Ashley Sherman, Revisiting the Landmark Caspian Sea Agreement, Wood
Mackenzie (6 September 2019) <https://www.woodmac.com/news/opinion/revisiting-thelandmark-caspian-sea-agreement/>.
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100

Diplomatic tensions between the two States reached a high point in 2001,
when Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan were in talks with the other littoral
States to determine the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Khalaf Khalafov,
chairman of the Azerbaijan delegation and deputy minister of Foreign
Affairs, promoted drawing a median line according to the points of
101
equidistance and stated this would be consistent with international law.
Conversely, Turkmenistan’s delegate advocated for the principle of
102
granting a 20 per cent division,
which is inconsistent with its later
preference of having UNCLOS apply in determining the delineation of
103
maritime zones.
At the close of discussions, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Turkmenistan published an official note stating that “such a
position of Azerbaijan, not considering the necessity of developing a
mutually acceptable solution, brings the process of talks to a dead end” and
100. Caspian Summit: Consequences for the Region, Warsaw Institute (14 September
2018) <https://warsawinstitute.org/caspian-summit-consequences-region/>.
101. Gulnara Ismayilova and Nailia Sohbetqizi, Diplomatic Tensions Between Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan, The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst (20 June 2001)
<https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/7357-field-reports-caci-analyst2001-6-20-art-7357.html>.
102. Id.
103. However, Turkmenistan generally vacillated between the two positions of having
either UNCLOS apply, or customary international law relating to lakes.
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called on Azerbaijan to “stop all work related to the exploration and
extraction of hydrocarbons as well as seismic explorations in the deposits of
hydrocarbons located in the disputable areas… until the matter of defining
104
the middle line is settled”.
Turkmenistan then closed its embassy to
Azerbaijan, and warned it would take their disagreement to the
105
International Court of Justice in the Hague.
Thereafter, both States engaged in an undeclared ‘arms race’, militarising
their respective territorial waters of the Caspian Sea, instilling concern that
106
a legal regime for the waters could never be agreed upon.
Wikileaks
documents revealed that on two occasions in 2008, Azerbaijani gunboats
threatened IOC ships working on behalf of Turkmenistan in the disputed
107
zones. On the first occasion, Malaysian company Petronas, operating on
contract with Turkmenistan, was allegedly working too close to
Azerbaijan’s maritime zone. During this incident, PGB claimed he had been
personally insulted by his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyez, and stated
108
Aliyez was “running like a little boy” and engaging in “hooliganism”.
On the second occasion, Azeri gunboats intercepted a vessel that Canadian
company, Buried Hill, had hired to perform research around the
Serdar/Kyapaz and Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli maritime oil fields. However,
BP, who was working on the Azeri side, was allegedly drilling diagonally
109
into Turkmenistan’s zone, further fueling their dispute. Not only did this
negatively impact upon negotiations pertaining to the Convention, it also
hindered efforts to construct the TCP, serving Russia’s obstructionist
position.
Despite tensions escalating between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, they,
along with the other Caspian littoral States, continued negotiations to
attribute a legal status to the Caspian waters, and as explored earlier, were
104. Gulnara Ismayilova and Nailia Sohbetqizi, supra note 101.
105. Though, the plausibility of this was limited by the fact that both States have not
recognised the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, nor any other international
arbitration court. See Shamkhal Abilov, Ceyhun Mahmudlu, and Natig Abdullayev, supra
note 96, at 235.
106. Hooman Peimani, Growing Tension and the Threat of War in the Southern Caspian
Sea: Unsettled Division Dispute and Regional Rivalry, Perspectives on Global Development
and Technology 2/3-4 (2003) 575, 576.
107. O’Byrne supra note 69; Joshua Kucera, Azerbaijan Gunships Threatened
Turkmenistan’s Caspian Oil Rigs, Cables Show, Eurasianet (14 June 2012)
<https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-gunships-threatened-turkmenistans-caspian-oil-rigscables-show>.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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successful in finalising this in 2018. The approval mechanism for laying
submarine pipelines is groundbreaking for Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan
alike. Moreover, the Convention established a framework or future bilateral
talks, but terms for border delimitation remain subject to agreement
between States with adjacent and opposite coasts, with due regard to the
generally recognised principles and norms of international law (which has
110
As such,
been considered one of the Convention’s failings).
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan must still divide their common maritime
border and determine ownership of the Kyapaz/Serdar field through a
bilateral agreement.
Remarkably, on 21 January 2021 the presidents of Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’), for joint
111
exploration of the Kyapaz/Serdar hydrocarbon field.
They renamed the
field ‘Dostluk’ or ‘Donstlug’, meaning friendship in their respective
languages, which highlights just how far relations have come between the
two. While an MoU is not legally binding, Azerbaijan’s Milli Medzhilis
112
and Turkmenistan’s Mejlis, have both ratified the agreement.
More
significant than this new source of new revenue for the States given low
natural-gas prices in 2021, is the indication of an intention to establish a
113
dialogue for the TCP.
As previously mentioned, cooperation between
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan is pertinent for realisation of the project. This
warming of relations demonstrates cooperation on both sides, and will
likely secure investor confidence in the region for IOCs and the EU.
IV. Conclusion
It is a critical moment in time for advancing construction of the TCP.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, laying submarine pipelines across
the Caspian seabed was stymied by uncertainty concerning the legal status
of the waters. The Convention has now settled this long-standing issue and
presents an opportunity for Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to embrace the
110. Convention, supra note 6, at arts 7(3), 8(1) and 9(1); Karataeva, supra note 12, at
261Sherman, supra note 98.
111. O’Byrne supra note 69.
112. Vladimir Afanasiev, Azeri Parliament Ratifies Agreement with Turkmenistan on
Caspian Sea ‘Friendship’ Block, upstream (24 February 2021) <https://www.upstream
online.com/exploration/azeri-parliament-ratifies-agreement-with-turkmenistan-on-caspiansea-friendship-block/2-1-969155>; Azernews, ‘Turkmenistan Ratifies Memorandum with
Azerbaijan on “Dotsluq” Field’, Azernews (14 March 2021) <https://www.azernews.
az/oil_and_gas/177083.html>.
113. O’Byrne, supra note 69.
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newly eased approval requirements for laying submarine pipelines. Russia
and Iran have raised environmental concerns with the TCP, casting doubt
over whether the pipeline can be built. However, this will likely be
overcome by EU investment and the European Commission’s
environmental scoping study, which concluded there were no major
concerns. Even if environmental issues were to arise, the Convention
requires the littoral States to cooperate, and industry best-practices could
guide completion of the TCP.114
Concerns about PGB’s restrictive policies toward onshore field
development can also be assuaged, as Turkmenistan does not need to enter
into PSCs to develop the TCP. Rather, investment may be sufficiently
provided through an ‘independent carrier’ model. 115 Nevertheless,
Turkmenistan’s ‘Era of Might and Happiness’ centres on the nation’s
ability to diversify its natural gas exports and increase demand, and
therefore its cooperation with the EU can be expected. The remaining issue
is whether current low natural-gas prices can justify development costs.
Given the political and economic backing behind the TCP, this article
firmly believes it can.

114. Cutler, supra note 63.
115. Id.
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